Context Matters - What Lawyers About Choice of Law in Merger Agreements by Kostritsky, Juliet P.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2015 
Context Matters - What Lawyers About Choice of Law in Merger 
Agreements 
Juliet P. Kostritsky 
Case Western University School of Law, juliet.kostritsky@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kostritsky, Juliet P., "Context Matters - What Lawyers About Choice of Law in Merger Agreements" (2015). 
Faculty Publications. 1645. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/1645 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Context Matters-What Lawyers Say About Choice of Law 
Decisions in Merger Agreements 
Juliet P. Kostritsky* 
study of choice of law provisions in merger agreements yields vari-
theories as to how much thought parties put into them, and what 
tors influence such decisions. Eisenberg and Miller found a shift to 
ew York law and other scholars later hypothesized that parties specify 
New York law rather than Delaware law because New York law is 
re formalistic. However, a study of 343 merger agreements, consist-
ing of 15 lawyer interviews and a survey sent to 812 lawyers across the 
rcountry, suggests differently. First, there is no shift from Delaware to 
New York. Second, a desire for formalistic law is not the motivating 
tor for lawyers. Choice of law provisions in merger agreements are 
tivated by a multitude of contextual factors. Further, the clients' in-
tent for choice of law is often unclear due to the way such provisions 
e drafted in the context of a principal agent relationship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Finding out the truth about a matter can proceed in many different 
ways. Neoclassical law and economists would construct models built 
on certain assumptions.1 The empiricists and contextualists would col-
lect data about the matter in the inductive not deductive sense.2 
1. The unreality of those assumptions has led Judge Posner himself to admit that its "basic 
propositions are really not empirical propositions at all. They are all generated by 'reflection' on 
an 'assumption' about choice under scarcity and rational maximization." Victoria Nourse & 
Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Prompt A New Legal The· 
ory, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 68 (2009). 
2. Of course, even the accumulation of evidence is subject to the "shocking discovery that 
induction is fallible " though of course, "it mostly works." JAMES FRANKLlN, WHAT ScrENCE 
KNows AND How IT KNows IT 11 (2009). Empiricists build a model of reality using large data 
sets and regression analysis. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002) 
(limiting definition of empirical scholarship to studies using statistical methods). For contextual-
ists such as Professor Stewart Macaulay, " [s]tatistical studies are not enough .... They enter the 
2015] CONTEXT MATTERS 213 
This Article follows the path of empiricists and contextualists by 
studying, in detail, the choices lawyers make in regard to choice of law 
provisions in merger deals. 
A close study of these provisions in merger agreements is important 
for several reasons. It illuminates how parties make choices in draft-
ing these contracts, shedding light on lawyering in a discrete transac-
tional setting. Studying the process of choice of law in merger 
agreements highlights the difficulties courts face when they try to in-
terpret the meaning behind any provision in a contract negotiated be-
tween commercial firms with assistance from counsel. Agency issues 
loom large in such settings.3 If a provision is included by a lawyer and 
the lawyer, not the client, makes the choice of law decision, what im-
plications does that have for a court trying to ascertain the party's (in 
the sense of the commercial firm's) intent on the choice of law issue? 
Is there such a thing as a party's intent when the commercial firm (the 
client) played little role in choosing the provision? Is the existence of 
a party's intent even possible if the party is not a sole proprietor? Will 
a study of choice of law provisions shed light on the role of lawyers 
more generally in transactional practice? Finally, are there implica-
tions for other issues not directly governed by the choice of law provi-
sions? By studying the meaning of choice of law in merger 
agreements, we may resolve other issues involving party choice such 
as: What interpretive approach to take to a contract when the goal 
begins with ascertaining the party's intent? and Whose intent matters 
and why? 
Choice of law provisions continue to generate great scholarly inter-
est. Early on, scholars collected choice of law data to study whether 
there was a shift in the preferred choice of law in merger agreements.4 
institutions of the world and observe, systematically interview and survey individuals within 
them." Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 79, 81. 
For a valuable discussion of the differences between inductively and deductively arrived at infer-
ences, see CHARLES MCCANN, JR., PROBABILITY FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 4-6 
(1994). McCann notes Hume's insight that " [a] reliance on empirical generalizations as a basis 
for the establishment of immutable laws of behavior is thus doomed to failure, since no causal 
relationship is determinable." Id. at 6. This Article does not seek to establish general laws valid 
across all circumstances but to capture a reality of lawyer's choices in a certain context. 
3. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Du KE L.J. 389, 394 (2003) 
(the "principal-agent problem involves the difficulty that one actor (the principal) will have in 
getting another actor (the agent) to work on the first party's behalf. A principal can reduce 
measurement costs to the extent that it can use financial or other incentives to align the self-
interest of the agent with its own interests.") 
4. Eisenberg and Miller emphasize that Delaware is still the preferred choice but that "to the 
degree that there is a flight from Delaware in this respect, the beneficiaries are New York and 
California." Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 V AND. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006). 
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To test the hypothesis that companies were fleeing to New York for 
their choice of law, Professors Eisenberg and Miller studied a group of 
merger agreements from a seven-month period in 2002 and found that 
there was a flight from Delaware to New York5 for the parties' choice 
of law6 in merger agreements.7 
Other scholars relied on a later Eisenberg and Miller study,8 which 
used a broader array of contracts documenting a flight to New York 
choice of law, to study the role of the transactional lawyer in drafting. 
They hypothesized that companies specify New York because of its 
5. The argument for a flight is built on data consisting of a study of merger agreements that 
suggest a "flow away from Delaware and Other and towards New York and California." Eisen-
berg & Miller, supra note 4, at 1989. The data showed 181 incorporations in Delaware but only 
135 choice of Delaware Jaw. Id. New York however, had only six incorporations but sixty-three 
choices of New York law. Id. Here the argument is not that a greater number of parties are 
choosing New York than they were in the past but ,that if a company is incorporated in New 
York, it is more likely to choose that state's Jaw to govern than a company is to choose Dela-
ware's Jaw to govern if it is incorporated in that New York. 
6. Parties can decide with each agreement what Jaw should govern. See Larry E: Ribstein, 
Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CoRP. L. 245, 247-48 (1993). Parties often place a provision in 
their merger contract specifying the Jaw that they want to govern the agreement. Id. Courts 
approach this issue by making a distinction between matters that are corporate in nature and 
those that are peripheral. See id. at 268. For corporate matters, the court will normally apply the 
Jaw of the state of incorporation, even if the merger agreement has chosen another Jaw to gov-
ern. See id. at 267. This is known as the internal affairs doctrine and is generally the approach 
taken by courts with the exception of California. See id. at 266; JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF 
A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 416 
n.47 (1975). As to peripheral, non-corporate matters, courts normally enforce such provisions 
unless they violate a constitutional provision of state Jaw. See Ribstein, supra note 6, at 294. 
California has a provision making it unconstitutional to enforce a non-compete clause as to a 
California employee even if the law of another state has been chosen to govern the agreement. 
See FREUND, supra note 6, 416 n.47. 
7. I have updated the Miller and Eisenberg study with a later data set for a later period of 
time, January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011. See KYLE CHEN, HAROLD HALLER, JULIET P. 
KosTRJTSKY & WmsoR A. WoYCZYNSKI., FINDING A TREND TOWARD DELAWARE As THE 
CHOICE OF LAW IN MERGER AGREEMENTS (on file with authors). My study is based on a data 
set from the SEC EDGAR Database and covers acquisitions of public and private targets. It 
directly tests the Miller and Eisenberg thesis to see if it still holds up at a later point in time. It . 
finds that most merger agreements choose Delaware and the next most popular choice is New 
York. The absence of data demonstrating a flight to New York in my statistical study does not 
make the task of understanding why a law is chosen any easier. It simply makes it harder to 
argue, at least if one accepts a characterization of New York Jaw as formal, that parties are 
fleeing to New York. The survey reveals that 95% of respondents indicated that there is no shift 
from Delaware to New York. A 2012 study followed up on the question of whether there was a 
net outflow away from Delaware but this study did so in the context of public acquisitions. See 
Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware's Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 92 (2012). I began my research a couple of years ago before the Cain and Davidoff study 
was published. 
8. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study 
of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009). 
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substantively more formalistic contract law.9 In this later work, law 
and economics scholars, including Jody Kraus and Robert Scott, relied 
on empirical evidence of a flight to support the new formalist view 
that courts should reject contextualism since the parties' flight to New 
York law demonstrates a formalistic preference.10 Their hypothesis 
was built on earlier scholarship using models to show that utility-maxi-
mizing commercial firms would prefer formalistic contract law, and 
then supposed that the flight to New York law reflected that 
pref erence.11 
Scott and Kraus hypothesized that parties use strategic thinking in 
choosing the law to govern an agreement to protect planning with re-
spect to all of the terms in the contract.12 The choice of law is made to 
ensure that courts use formal contract doctrine in interpreting all of 
the contract terms that have been carefully negotiated and chosen ex 
ante. 13 This hypothesis rests on a general view that lawyers carefully 
construct contracts and wish to guard against courts using their discre-
tion to interpret contracts or fill in terms for the parties, absent ex-
press party direction.14 
A rival hypothesis of contract drafting in contract theory ( devel-
oped outside the M&A context) posits that clients and lawyers pay 
almost no attention to the terms of the contract ex ante. Instead, law-
yers simply copy language from a prior agreement without much 
thought. The decision to copy prior language unreflectively stems 
from the lawyer's disinclination to spend time on a provision or term 
that will be difficult to bill to the client.15 Claire Hill, Mitu Gulati, and 
Robert Scott documented this theory of contract drafting in non-
9. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1023 (2009). Professor Scott cites the Eisenberg and Miller studies as "illus-
trat[ing) the strong preference of commercial parties for the formal contract law of New York in 
lieu of frequent exercise of equitable overrides by courts in California." Id. at 1062. As Kraus 
and Scott explain: "The strong preference of sophisticated parties for New York contract law is 
consistent with our claim that those parties prefer an adjudicatory system that consistently ap-
plies formal doctrine, absent the parties' express indication otherwise at the time of formation. " 
Id. at 1093. Professors Kraus and Scott were referring to a larger array of contracts and not the 
merger agreements but if that is so, that would raise the question, why the merger agreement 
context would engender different results on the formality issue. 
10. Id. 
11. See id. at 1061-62. 
12. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1074. 
13. See id. at 1026. 
14. See id. 
15. But see discussion with Lawyer 5 who took strong exception to this picture of corporate 
transactional drafting. Interview with Lawyer 5 (Nov. 6, 2013) (on file with author). 
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M&A contexts.16 Based on empirical studies, they conclude that cli-
ents will not pay for bespoke drafting unless the costs of the standard 
language clearly pose so many risks as to outweigh the drafting costs. 
In addition, introducing terms different from those of a prior agree-
ment may lengthen expensive negotiations. The cost-benefit analysis 
favors leaving terms the same in light of the expense of making 
changes and the rare chance of complications. 
I begin my research with another hypothesis of contract drafting 
that falls into neither the Kraus/Scott strategic model nor the unreflec-
tive copying model. The hypothesis states that lawyers deliberately 
make the particular choice of law provision, not because of any sub-
stantive aspects of contract law in a particular jurisdiction, but because 
of the lawyers' internal professional concerns in relation to avoiding . 
malpractice. I surmise that because lawyers would want to ensure that • 
they are knowledgeable with the chosen law to avoid any liability for 
malpractice that might come with specifying the law of a jurisdiction 
with which they are unfamiliar,17 lawyers will specify a choice of law 
with which they or a member of their firm are familiar. However, the 
data demonstrates that lawyers seem comfortable with the law of both 
Delaware and New York,18 and that they may be comfortable with the 
16. Claire A. Hill , What Mistakes Do Lawyers Make in Complex Contracts, and What Can and 
Should be Done About Them? Some Preliminary Thoughts, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS 
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 224, 229-30 
(Jean Braucher et al. , ed., 2013) (discussing how in securitization contracts many provisions be-
came standardized and inserted into the contracts without much review). Mitu Gulati and Rob-
ert Scott document a similar pattern in the context of explaining the persistence of a version of 
the pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts despite an adverse court decision. See M1Tu 
GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE 
AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 73-88 (2013). They explained the failure to change the 
clause in terms of the costs of redrafting. Id. at 38. They also developed keen insights from 
lawyer interviews into the causes of the "stickiness" of the offending clause. Id. at 79. These 
works by Hill, Gulati and Scott represent in depth examinations of contract drafting in the con-
text of actual lawyers conducting deals. They set a high bar and provide a paradigm for future 
work in the area. 
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 5.5 (a lawyer can engage in multidistrict prac-
tice when they gain a pro hac vice admission to appear in that court or when they are providing 
"legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that . . . (2) are in or reasonably related to 
a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, 
or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or 
reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential 
arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another juris-
diction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdic-
tion in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires 
pro hac vice admission[.]") 
18. See Kirkland M&A Update: Delaware vs. New York Governing Law - Six of One, Half 
Dozen of Other?, KIRKLAND & ELLIS 1 (Dec. 17, 2013), available at http://www.kirkland.com/site 
Files/Publications/MAUpdate_121713.pdf (" [w]hile the outcome on most issues [in purchase 
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contract law of other jurisdictions without necessarily being licensed 
to practice law in it,19 with the exception of Alabama and California, 
which seem to be outlier jurisdictions.20 Lawyers seem comfortable 
with several possibilities for a choice of law.21 Since lawyers seem 
comfortable with both New York and Delaware law, without necessa-
rily being licensed in those jurisdictions, the desire to avoid malprac-
tice cannot account for the difference between lawyers choosing New 
York versus Delaware law. 
The Article's final hypothesis of contract drafting (and lawyering) 
though falls somewhat in the middle between the Kraus and Scott po-
sition of carefully tailored strategic choice of law provisions and the 
Hill, Gulati, and Scott unreflective copying model. It is that lawyers 
put a moderate level of thought into choice of law provisions, and that 
the choice is very contextual. Lawyers do spend some thought on the 
choice of law provision-it is not simply copied or ignored. This de-
gree of thought is evidenced by the fact that some lawyers use differ-
ent states' governing law in different merger agreements. But, deep 
thought is not given to the matter either. Lawyers' comfort with a 
range of governing laws, seeking to avoid only one or two jurisdic-
tions, contributes to the lack of deep thought. This theory of contract 
drafting in merger agreements rejects the hypothesis that the choice of 
law is done strategically to choose a formalist law to protect planning 
with respect to all of the terms in the contract. Lawyers making 
choice of law decisions in merger agreements think strategically in a 
narrow sense (for example, which sandbagging provision applies) at 
times, but do not seem to think strategically in a broad sense that con-
agreements] is unlikely to differ significantly between Delaware and New York," there are some 
notable exceptions.) 
19. This might be especially true if the lawyer did not need to deliver an opinion. Lawyer 2 
noted that some jurisdictions are frowned on, including California due to problems with enforc-
ing non-compete covenants, Massachusetts due to being not viewed as business friendly, and 
Louisiana due to its civil code. Interview with Lawyer 2 (Nov. 15, 2013) (on file with author). 
My survey data confirmed that being licensed in the jurisdiction ranked very low with lawyers as 
a reason for choosing a particular jurisdiction 's law to govern the agreement. In agreements 
where New York law was chosen, 11 out of 47 respondents ranked the law firm having an office 
in the jurisdiction as the least important reason for the choice of law in an agreement. In agree-
ments where Delaware was chosen, 32 out of 70 respondents ranked "having an office in Dela-
ware" as the least important reason for selecting Delaware law. 
20. Lawyer 1 raised questions about Alabama's jury system. Interview with Lawyer 1 (Nov. 
11, 2013) (on file with author). 
21. Lawyer 8 explained that the basic choice of law came down to four options: the acquiring 
party's primary executive office, the state of incorporation, New York law, and Delaware law. 
Interview with Lawyer 8 (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with author) . Lawyer 2 stated that choice of law 
usually came down to Delaware, New York or the state in which the target is incorporated. 
Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 19. 
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siders all aspects of the contract. Although there may be sound rea-
sons to suppose any of these theories were correct,22 surveying 
lawyers on this decision would be the only way to resolve the issue. 
To find out more about why contracts specify New York law or an-
other jurisdiction's law I used empirical data by (1) interviewing a se-
lect group of fifteen merger and acquisition lawyers,23 and (2) 
conducting a survey sent to 812 mergers and acquisitions lawyers lo-
cated throughout the country.24 The evidence determines whether 
data supports that commercial firms make choice of law decisions 
based on a strategic desire for formalistic law,25 unthinking copying, 
lawyer malpractice concerns, or a hybrid theory of moderate thought. 
This study reveals three important findings: (1) there is no single 
overarching or predominant reason lawyers give for choosing the law 
of a particular jurisdiction to govern a merger agreement; (2) lawyers, 
not clients, make the choice of law decision; and (3) the particular 
context matters in the choice of law decision. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Phase One: Interview A Select Group Of Lawyers In The 
Mergers And Acquisitions Field 
The first phase of the research consisted of qualitative background 
interviews with fifteen mergers and acquisitions attorneys to find out 
more about how they think about, and choose, the law to govern a 
22. The decision on choice of law may resemble many other contractual choices that de-
manded some thought but are not contentious or a deal-breaker. That approach to drafting may 
be different with a standard boilerplate contract. In such contexts, as clearly shown by Gulati 
and Scott, there are a number of reasons why "stickiness" and a reluctance to vary the terms at 
all will prevail. See GULATI & Scorr, supra note 16, at 33-43. For a fascinating and closely 
analyzed discussion of the reasons for stickiness in such contracts, see id. 
23. Bill Whitford emphasized the importance of speaking to lawyers rather than just sending 
out paper surveys. Interview with William Whitford, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, 
School of Law (Mar. 4, 2013) (on file with author). Stewart Macaulay continues to conduct this 
type of research with great effect ever since his study of Wisconsin businessmen revealed the 
non-use of contract law in their business transactions. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM: Soc . REv. 55 (1963). My own view is that it 
was by talking to lawyers that a picture of the lawyering involved in the choice of law emerged. 
24. The data set was compiled from the SEC EDGAR database and identified merger agree-
ments entered into between January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011. By looking at the notice provi-
sions in the M&A agreements, my assistants identified 812 lawyers who worked on the 
agreements and were entitled to receive notifications and documents. We then compiled an 
email list of all the lawyers. We sent a hard copy of a letter to all 812 lawyers inviting them to 
participate in the study either by filling out a hard copy of the survey or by accessing a survey via 
the web. We guaranteed that the results would be anonymous. The majority of responses were 
by hard copy although some answered using a survey on the web. 
25. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1103. 
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merger agreement. These interviews were off the record and I kept 
the results anonymous by recording them as "Interview #1," "Inter-
view #2," and etc. It was my hope that the preliminary phase of talk-
ing to lawyers, preferably after they had taken a draft of the survey, 
could proceed without any need to get a formal , signed consent or get 
Institutional Review Board ("IRB") approval.26 The university's IRB 
office agreed that no consent form was required. 
The interviews were with mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") law-
yers I know or to whom I was referred by lawyers I know. Former 
students also provided helpful referrals. The interviews provided use-
ful information about how to craft a survey. I hoped to increase the 
chance of getting a good response rate on the survey (the second 
phase of the project) by interviewing lawyers and getting their reac-
tions to a draft survey. These lawyers' comments resulted in adjust-
ments, and hopefully improvements, to the initial survey. 
B. Phase Two: Conduct Survey Of All 812 Lawyers From 343 
Merger Agreements27 
The second phase of research involved a survey ("the survey") of all 
of the 812 lawyers who worked on the selected set of merger agree-
ments. The names and addresses of the lawyers are public informa-
tion from the SEC EDGAR database. The merger agreements 
themselves are accessible to the public via the SEC EDGAR 
database.28 
I wrote to these 812 lawyers and gave them the opportunity to re-
spond by mailing back a hard copy of the survey or by taking the 
survey online using Qualtrics.29 One hundred nine survey responses 
came back.30 The survey response rate was 13.4%.31 This is an admit-
26. I initially thought that the interviews with lawyers might require university approval 
through the IRB process and feared the IRB consent form would be a hindrance for lawyers 
participating. In fact, after speaking to a professor who has conducted interviews of lawyers, it 
became apparent that the lawyers found the consent form, the time spent on describing my 
commitment to confidentiality and the effort of getting the signed consent form annoying. Inter-
view with Ann Southworth, Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law 
(Mar. 6, 2013). 
27. This comprehensive survey meant that I did not need to worry about a particular group of 
lawyers on one side of the transaction skewing the survey results . 
28. Important Information About EDGAR, SEC (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/edgar/ 
aboutedgar.htm. 
29. Conversations with other scholars, who are experts in survey data, convinced me that I 
would get a better number of responses with a hard copy mailing than with an online survey. 
30. However, not all respondents answered every question. 
31. The response rate is low enough that a statistician might suggest that the results of the 
study cannot be used to estimate what the response rate would be for the whole population of 
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tedly low response rate but since this is the only survey that has sys-
tematically studied the lawyers responsible for drafting the choice of 
law provision in merger agreements, it may be a significant beginning 
in the conversation and perhaps provide a foundation for future 
studies.32 
The results of the survey were to remain anonymous. The Informa-
tion Technology Services Department at Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity assured me that the surveys could be filled out so that the 
results could not be traced back to any particular lawyer. Because the 
lawyers who would receive the survey are extremely sophisticated and 
are representing public companies in drafting merger agreements in 
transactions that need to be reported to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"), we had to assuage any fears that their answers 
would be discoverable in later litigation involving any merger transac-
tion. This guarantee of anonymity was necessary to generate a decent 
participation rate. 
The Qualtrics program used to conduct the survey is a robust survey 
tool that has been successfully used by Case Western Reserve School 
of Law in prior data collection. It allows for anonymity, yet also per-
mits monitoring to determine whether surveys have been started or 
completed, without disclosing the identity of the survey taker. Also, it 
ensures that only the recipient to whom the survey was sent can fill 
out the survey, thereby preserving the integrity of the research results. 
C. Phase Three: Evaluate Sample And Analyze Results 
In order for the study to be valid, the sample had to be an informed 
group in which the lawyers actually had to confront and think about 
the choice of law issue. In addition to the fact that respondent lawyers 
were chosen based on their experience with mergers and acquisitions, 
Questions 9 and 11 support that the sample was valid-sixty-six of 104 
respondents chose New York law in at least one merger agreement,33 
while ninety-nine of 103 choose Delaware in at least one merger 
agreement.34 There is substantial overlap because the same respon-
dents answered both questions; since 96.12% chose Delaware, most of 
M&A lawyers. However, I have a big enough response rate that if there were a consistent and 
strong pattern, such as all lawyers wanting a formalist jurisdiction, it would show up. 
32. I would be happy to share my email lists, list of lawyers, and survey form, all contact 
information as well as the list of transactions/deals covered by my 2011 survey with other 
scholars. 
33. See infra Appendix Question 9 (sixty-six respondents answered "yes" to "(h]as there been 
a merger agreement where you have chosen New York law?"). 
34. See infra Appendix Question 11 (ninety-nine respondents answered "yes" to " (h]as there 
been a merger agreement where you have chosen Delaware law?"). 
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the 63.46% that chose New York also chose Delaware on at least one 
occasion. The fact that a majority of respondent lawyers choose dif-
ferent laws on different occasions supports the fact that they have to 
choose and think about choice of law, verifying the validity of the 
sample and negating the drafting model of unreflective copying. 
After the surveys were returned, I was able to schedule additional 
interviews with M&A lawyers. I then gathered the information ac-
quired from both the interviews and the surveys to evaluate what de-
termines choice of law in merger agreements. This comprehensive 
analysis yielded the following results. 
III. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM AND OTHER INTENT ISSUES 
An important caveat to understanding choice of law provisions in 
contracts, and what that choice can tell us about lawyering and its rel-
evance for discerning the choice the clients/principals are making in 
the transactions, pertains to who makes the choice and what the pro-
cess of the choice is like. Without research on that process, one might 
erroneously conclude that a party's intent for choice of law is clear 
when an explicit provision exists. However, the meaning or intent un-
derlying choice of law provisions in merger agreements can be unclear 
for a number of reasons. The principal-agent relationship is particu-
larly tricky factor in this arena. Further, intent may be unclear in the 
case of a corporation without a single brain, but mixed motives for the 
same decision, which makes my evaluation difficult.35 Such issues im-
pact choice of law theories and must be considered when evaluating 
the significance of such provisions. 
A. The Principal-Agent Relationship Yields Significant Implications 
In Determining The "Party's" Intent 
Perhaps the most significant finding of the survey is reflected in the 
answers to Questions 17 and 18 addressing to what extent the choice 
of laws are client-driven versus law-firm driven. In Question 17, the 
respondents were asked to attach a percentage to indicate the percent 
to which the client determines choice of law. Sixty-four of 100 respon-
dents said it is 0%, 10%, or 20% client-driven (19, 24, and 21 respon-
dents, respectively).36 Only 4% responded that the decision was 80%, 
35. The analysis of the complexity of choice in contracts involving principals and agents has 
implications for other determinations of choice or intent as in contract interpretation. 
36. See infra Appendix Question 17. 
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90%, or 100% client-driven.37 Similarly, in Question 18, sixty-eight of 
100 respondents said choice of law is 70% , 80%, 90%, or 100% law 
firm-driven (16, 18, 17, and 17, respectively).38 Clearly, the data over-
whelmingly supports the view that lawyers are making the determina-
tion about choice of law, not the client. 
When a court looks at a party's agreement in any context, it is sub-
suming into what it calls "the party's intent"-all of the conscious and 
unconscious decisions that are actually made by the party's agents and 
advisors, without those persons necessarily, and in fact usually not, 
informing the principal. The agent's decisions are made are without 
the principal's knowledge or understanding of the decision or its im-
plications, and yet are imputed to the principal. Under these circum-
stances, what kind of choice or intent can we attribute to the principal 
when the lawyer survey results indicate that the lawyer, not the client, 
made the choice? 
In the context of choice of law in merger agreements, lawyers cite a 
number of reasons for why they may want a particular governing law 
regardless of the clients' intent,39 and the survey clearly demonstrates 
that lawyers are making this decision-not the client. What is left 
open for debate is whether this should affect determination of what 
the "party's" intent was in drafting a choice of law provision. Is the 
lawyer's intent sufficient for demonstrating the client's intent, or is the 
client's intent not clear in the absence of the client being involved in 
this decision? 
Additionally, agency-cost problems are intertwined with the dynam-
ics of the principal-agent relationship, further illustrating the potential 
conflict for intent in the principal-agent relationship in the context of 
choice of law provisions in merger agreements. The agency-cost prob-
lem develops when the interests of the lawyer and the company are 
not coterminous.40 As O'Hara and Ribstein posit, "[a]gency costs ex-
ist whenever power is delegated to agent. "41 A lawyer is the client's 
delegate, yet the lawyer might be concerned with having a choice of 
law with predictability that lowers the costs of understanding laws 
outside the lawyer's jurisdiction, and therefore be driven to choose a 
37. Interview with Lawyer 4 (May 1, 2013) (on file with author). The small role played by 
clients in the choice of law contrasts with the interviews indicating that clients care about the 
choice of venue or forum. 
38. See infra Appendix Question 18. 
39. See infra Appendix Question 12 (citing expertise of judges in Delaware). 
40. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF Bus1NESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1990) . 
41. See Erin A . O 'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 
U. Cm. L. REv. 1151, 1157 (2000). 
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law with which the lawyer is familiar, even if the substantive rule at 
issue is a costly one to the client. Rather than choosing an unfamiliar 
jurisdiction, the lawyer might prefer crafting a clause around any sub-
stantive rule the client wished to avoid, even if it required additional 
lawyer time. Although potentially producing a choice of law satisfac-
tory to both the lawyer and client, its creation would result in more 
billable hours for the law firm and more cost for the client. Further, 
regardless of whether the lawyer's provision accounted for the client's 
substantive rule concerns, the law chosen may still not be the client's 
intended choice. 
A follow-up survey could shed more light on the diverging interests 
between lawyers and clients. We must know more about what lawyers 
tell clients about choice of law. We must also know what clients tell 
lawyers, such as whether they tell lawyers to handle the matter as a 
matter of boilerplate,42 or whether they broadly delegate the decision 
to the lawyers. Further, do clients set any parameters on the lawyer's 
choice of law recommendation or determination, or is the lawyer free 
to make the decision for the client? Differences in answers to these 
questions in a future study will determine to what extent the choice of 
law reflects a client's preference as opposed to a lawyer's preference. 
B. Can A Commercial Firm have Intent? 
Putting aside the principal-agent issue, is a commercial firm even 
capable of manifesting intent, except in the case of the sole proprie-
tor? The principal-agent issue brings about a potential problem of de-
termining the client's intent when the lawyer makes the decision. 
However, even if the lawyer does not make the decision, and the cli-
ent makes the decision, who can speak for the client's intent in the 
case of a corporation? In the case of a sole proprietor, it is clear there 
is one owner and this owner is the client. However, in the case of a 
corporation, there may be a person within the corporation appointed 
to make certain decisions. Is this person's decision as to choice of law 
necessarily representative of the corporation's (the client's) decision, 
or is it merely a single person's decision? Further, should the law as-
sess the choice differently with a sole proprietor than a corporation, or 
should it automatically accept that a corporation's decision-maker 
represents the intent of the corporation? 
42. Lawyer 13 indicated that the choice of law "is not given any conscientious thought." In-
terview with Lawyer 13 (Nov. 21 , 2013) (on file with author). 
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C. Forum Drives Law: Intent For Forum But Unclear 
Intent For Law? 
The survey demonstrates that lawyers think choice of forum influ-
ences choice of law. Thirty-four percent of respondents thought that 
the forum had a significant impact on the choice of law while 51 % 
thought the forum choice had a moderate impact on the choice of 
law.43 This raises the question that if choice of law is determined by 
choice of forum, is there actually intent behind the choice of law deci-
sion, or is the choice of law decision merely a result of choice of forum 
with no conscious thought? Let us first look at why choice of forum 
influences choice of law. 
One key reason choice of forum influences choice of law is that 
lawyers do not like to bifurcate. A lawyer can legally bifurcate and 
specify one forum to litigate and another law to govern the agree-
ment. 44 For example, a deal can have an Ohio forum applying Dela-
ware law.45 However, one lawyer said that she never bifurcated 
choice of law and choice of forum issues.46 This lawyer's concern is 
that if there is an Ohio forum but Delaware choice of law, the Ohio 
court will place an Ohio "spin" to the Delaware law. Because some 
counsel fear that a court of one jurisdiction might not properly apply 
the law of another jurisdiction, there might be an unwillingness to se-
lect a forum that is different from the governing law. 
Another lawyer articulated a different reason choice of forum might 
influence choice of law: many of the same issues will drive both forum 
and law decisions because many transactional lawyers do not always 
distinguish the two choices. If they are not distinguished, the relative 
importance of forum versus law may determine which one influences 
the other. 
A key point I learned from counsel interviews is that clients care 
about forum more than they care about the choice of law issue.47 Two 
43. See infra Appendix Question 1. 
44. For example, an Ohio forum applying Delaware Jaw. 
45. This would be the result under the internal affairs doctrine. 
46. Lawyer 1 suggested that she never bifurcates forum and choice of Jaw. Interview with 
Lawyer 1, supra note 20. Presumably, she always includes both a choice of forum and choice of 
law. Id. This is consistent with a result in the Eisenberg and Miller study. See Eisenberg & 
Miller, supra note 4, at 1503 (" [w]hen a forum is specified, it overwhelmingly corresponds with a 
contract's choice of Jaw."). 
47. Lawyer 7 suggested clients might care more about fo rum because of the potential costs of 
having to litigate in an inconvenient place, and the quality of lawyers in Delaware. Interview 
with Lawyer 7 (Oct. 23, 2013) (on file with author). Lawyer 11 indicated that what matters is 
forum, not choice of law. Interview with Lawyer 11 (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with author) . Law-
yer 8 confirmed, "clients generally seem more concerned with venue than choice of substantive 
law." Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 21. 
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interviewed lawyers explained that their clients worried about litiga-
tion costs48 and the quality of lawyering in a jurisdiction.49 Those con-
cerns might drive the choice of a forum so as to minimize expense by 
the client, such as travel costs. Further, some situations may call for a 
specific forum for other reasons; one lawyer indicated that he thought 
that there was a strong pressure for the forum to be Delaware to send 
the case to the experts. 50 
The context of agreements can cause choosing forum ahead of time 
to be particularly important in certain situations.51 Forum selection 
clauses may be most prevalent in two types of contracts. The first type 
is an adhesion contract, which potential defendants (such as cruise 
lines) insist on a pro-defendant choice of forum ahead of time to fore-
close any plaintiffs from having the advantage of filing in a jurisdiction 
that is more favorable to plaintiffs.52 The second type of contract in-
volves parties who are relatively equal in bargaining strength and 
reach agreement on a forum so that going forward neither party can 
threaten to take the other party to an unfavorable forum as a way of 
gaining concessions.53 
One lawyer who participated in the interviews said that forum 
might matter in choice of law where a client wants a rocket docket, 
such as in Virginia.54 In this case, if the lawyer is choosing a particular 
forum for a procedural advantage, it may influence the choice of law, 
48. Lawyer 8 said venue issues could potentially add costs because of need to engage local 
counsel and pay travel costs. Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 21. 
49. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 47. "Why NY forum? Once you need to go to court 
in Delaware, would need to engage local Delaware lawyers and not that many great ones." Id. 
50. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. 
51. As Professor Robertson points out, there are reasons why particular subset of defendants 
might want to insist on forum selection clauses in their contracts. Email from Cassandra Robert-
son, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Nov. 18, 2013, 15:17 EST) 
(on file with author). 
Id. 
I think that in spite of the forum non conveniens doctrine, the plaintiff still wields a lot 
of power in deciding where to file suit initially. So forum selection clauses are espe-
cially valuable to potential defendants, but are more valuable for avoiding unfavorable 
fora than affirmatively choosing favorable ones (even though the effect of the clause is 
to choose one-parties may choose New York or London as the forum, but they proba-
bly care more about avoiding Alabama than they care whether they actually litigate in 
New York or London) . 
52. See, e.g. , Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
53. See Email from Cassandra Robertson to Juliet P. Kostritsky, supra note 51. 
54. Interview with Lawyer 9 (Apr. 25, 2013) (on file with author). See Heather Russell Koe-
nig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civillustice Reform, 32 U. R1cH. L. 
REV. 799 (1998) (discussing the efficiencies of a single federal court). 
ii I 
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especially if there is any concern about bifurcating the forum and the 
choice of law. 
Whether parties insist on forum provisions generally55 can involve 
the context, identity of the parties, and subsequently, whether there 
are particular advantages and/or disadvantages in failing to choose a 
forum ahead of time. 
With this perspective, we can circle back to the question of whether 
the influence of forum on law affects the intent behind a choice of law 
provision. We know that lawyers do not like to split forum and law 
because they avoid bifurcating, and sometimes do not even distinguish 
forum from law. We also know that clients are much more concerned 
with forum than they are with law, especially in certain situations. So, 
choice of law may be made as a default to a choice of forum. In such a 
scenario, is choice of law a conscious decision being made with intent 
behind that decision? Or is it merely a provision that is not expressly 
thought about, and therefore has no unequivocal intent behind it? 
One could argue either way. The implications are consequential not 
just to choice of law provisions in merger agreements, but any con-
tractual provision that may not be consciously thought about for vari-
ous reasons. 
Essentially, the question is whether there is a level of thought nec-
essary to manifest intent. If there is, the various theories of drafting 
choice of law provisions become even more important. Under the for-
malist theory, the choice is a conscious strategic decision. But under 
the unthinking copying theory, the choice is not even considered. If 
conscious thought is required to manifest intent, and the provision is 
merely copied, could the provision be successfully challenged in litiga-
tion? A further study could reveal more about the relationship be-
tween choice of forum and choice of law, and the implications of this 
relationship. 
D. Mixed Motives for the Same Decision 
In large merger agreements, there are many players on both sides 
making decisions, and many subjective reasons behind these decisions. 
If multiple people have the same desire for a particular issue, but have 
different underlying reasons why they share this desire, their differ-
ences in reasoning may rtot affect the ultimate result. For example, 
one individual lawyer working for "Law Firm A" may choose a provi-
sion for reasons of convenience while another lawyer working for Law 
55. I do not have the data on how many parties in merger agreements choose forum as well as 
choice of law. 
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Firm A may choose the same provision but for a completely different 
reason. The second lawyer may have found the provision in a prior 
agreement and favor adopting it without much thought or motive. 
Another may choose that provision because of personal comfort with 
that jurisdiction and malpractice concerns. Yet, another lawyer may 
agree to it because her client has indicated that it is not a deal-
breaker, or the lawyer may not know whether the choice of law pro-
posed by the other side is objectionable and therefore cannot tell her 
client not to agree to it. 
In such a situation, the different motives for each lawyer may be 
inconsequential if the same final result is reached. However, for our 
purposes of studying why lawyers act the way they do in relation to 
choice of law in merger agreements, such situations raise difficulty de-
ciphering what the motive was for the choice that was made, if differ-
ent parties had different motives for the same decision. These 
situations are common with choice of law in merger agreements, mak-
ing it difficult to put the choice of law into one of the various hypothe-
ses without understanding more about the complexities of choosing. 
E. Implications of Intent Issues for Formalist Theory 
The fact that lawyers and not commercial firms are choosing the law 
to govern the agreement undermines an important claim of the new 
formalists. 56 The logical progression of the new formalist argument is 
that to the extent that commercial parties are choosing New York law 
in greater numbers and fleeing Delaware they are embracing "the for-
mal contract law of New York. "57 However, there are intent problems 
with the idea that commercial firms are choosing New York for for-
malism. First, commercial firms are not deciding choice of law-their 
lawyers are deciding.58 Second, even if the commercial firms are de-
ciding, there is no single brain making choices for such a firm except 
in the case of a sole proprietorship, leaving an unclear intent for the 
firm as a whole. Further, if clients care more about venue than choice 
of law, then it becomes harder to argue that the commercial firms are 
56. If the clients were directing the lawyers' choice, then it might still be possible to argue that 
the choice of law represents the firm's choice. However, because of a possible divergence in 
interests, the lawyer may not simply implement the client's wishes. See infra Part IV. Alterna-
tively, the client may not care about the choice of law and simply instruct the lawyer to make the 
choice. If that is the case, the choice of Jaw does not represent a commercial firm's choice. See 
also supra Part II. 
57. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1062. 
58. This would be true in my survey but it may not be the case in the broader array of con-
tracts studied by Eisenberg and Miller and referenced by Kraus and Scott. Further work could 
be done surveying the lawyers drafting the broader array of contracts. 
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choosing formalistic contract law in order to "economize on con-
tracting costs."59 If the lawyers are making the choice, what can we 
surmise about how much their choice reflects concerns of the client 
company and how much the choice reflects the lawyers' own concerns 
and preferences?60 
Many of the arguments for preferring formalistic contract law are 
been built on a model of what most commercial firms hypothetically 
prefer.61 Recent empirical studies showing a flight to New York are 
cited as confirmatory evidence of the preference of commercial firms 
for a formalistic law. Scholars rely on the combination of the hypo-
thetical preference and the empirical data to provide the foundation 
for a much larger claim that courts should normatively follow formal-
ism and reject contextualism since that is what commercial parties 
prefer. 
However, if the choice of law in the merger agreement is not the 
commercial firm's choice but the lawyer's choice, the choice of gov-
erning law by itself tells us little about what choice commercial firms 
would make or are making. Therefore, given the data collected show-
ing a clear indication that the lawyer is making the choice, one can no 
longer rely on the formalist theory to assume that by enforcing choice 
of law the corporation's preference is being implemented. 
IV. NEW YORK vs. DELAWARE: COMPARISON AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. Lawyers are Comfortable with Both Delaware and New York 
Contract Law, but are More Comfortable with Delaware 
Lawyers in the survey report greater comfort with Delaware con-
tract law than New York contract law.62 When asked to "select a 
phrase to describe how comfortable you, or a member of your firm, 
are with Delaware law" with the options of "very comfortable"; "com-
fortable"; "probably comfortable"; and "very uncomfortable," the op-
59. Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1028-29. 
60. The possibility that there could be a disjunction between the client and the lawyer arises in 
the related choice of forum. As one scholar says, "[p]roblems initially occur when any diver-
gence of interest arises between the client and the attorney." Michael J. Maloney & Allison 
Taylor Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International Litigation: "Where Angels Fear to 
Tread", 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 933, 950-51 (1995); see also SusAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2002). 
61. Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1061. See also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003) (discussing interpretation 
that courts "should facilitate the ability of firms to maximize welfare "); see also id. at 573-574 
(discussing firms' interpretive preferences) (emphasis added). 
62. See Lawyer 6 indicated that " [i]f you are a Kansas lawyer, you are comfortable with Dela-
ware but not New York Jaw." Interview with Lawyer 6 (Sept. 13, 2013) (on file with author). 
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tions generated 66; 26; 12; and 1 selections, respectively. The 
corresponding question for New York law generated 57; 30; 15; and 3 
selections, respectively. 
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The first question to ask about these results is: are these results sur-
prising or significant, and what may they explain? Second, how do the 
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results relate to the Article's hypothesis that lawyers devote a moder-
ate amount of time to the choice, are fairly comfortable with the com-
mon law of most jurisdictions (except outlier ones), and that context 
and particular issues drive the choice of law rather than a strategic 
choice? 
As to the first question, one lawyer63 said that lawyers at big law 
firms in the 1990s would not have said that they were more familiar 
with Delaware contract law than New York contract law. Yet, survey 
data shows that 64% of respondents said that they were very comfort-
able with Delaware contract law, whereas only 56% of respondents 
selected the same as to New York contract law. This raises the ques-
tion of what lawyers mean by comfort with the law of a jurisdiction, 
and how and why the lawyers' comfort level with the law of a jurisdic-
tion affects the choice of law. 
One lawyer drew a distinction between being generally comfortable 
with New York law in the sense of being knowledgeable enough to 
avoid malpractice, and possessing the degree of expertise required to 
render an opinion.64 This lawyer would not be comfortable enough 
with New York contract law to give an opinion or draft a complaint.65 
However, the lawyer does not feel the need to be familiar with all 
aspects of the law because the lawyer can employ a Lex Mundi law 
firm that has a branch office in every state.66 
When lawyers say their comfort level with Delaware contract law is 
high, it may be because they think that the Delaware contract law that 
matter the most are limited provisions such as the material adverse 
change ("MAC") clause67 and the no-shop clause,68 which are related 
63. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. Most lawyers do not consider themselves experts 
in Delaware contract law but are comfortable with New York law because a partner or a firm is 
an expert. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54. 
64. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20. 
65. Id.; see e.g., infra Part IV. 
66. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20; See Member Firm Locations, LEX MuNDI, availa-
ble at www.lexmundi.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (website for global law firm) . 
67. See STEPHEN I. GLOVER ET AL., M&A PRACTICE GUIDE§ 12.04(1]-(3]. A closing condi-
tion of a purchase agreement typically provides that there be no material adverse changes since 
the agreement was signed. Id. at § 12.04(2) (explaining that "a buyer invoking the failure of a 
MAC condition must meet a high burden to prove that a MAC has occurred"). 
68. Id. at § 1.04 ("The no-shop/exclusivity agreement provides that the target and its owners 
will not discuss the possibility of transaction with any other party while negotiations are under-
way."). See also EDWIN L. MILLER, JR. , MERGERS AND AcomsnioNs: A STEP-BY-STEP LEGAL 
AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 248 (2008) (explaining that these clauses "come in multiple strengths 
.. . . "). Lawyer 6 said that, in public deals, "one of the most litigated issues is corporate fiduciary 
duty. That duty might involve when you have to shop the transaction. " Interview with Lawyer 
6, supra note 62. That lawyer found the "legal standard in Massachusetts" to be "opaque and 
not as clearly stated as in Delaware." Id. 
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to corporate law issues. Since most lawyers are comfortable with the 
Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"),69 they may indicate 
that they perhaps are also comfortable with Delaware contract law.70 
Expressions of comfort with Delaware contract law by a lawyer may 
also mean that he is just saying no one hears anything untoward about 
Delaware contract law in the way that parties hear bad things about 
California law.71 It may also be a lack of experience by the lawyer 
with Delaware contract law.72 
The Berkshire Hathaway acquisition of Burlington Northern illus-
trates the comfort level with Delaware contract law and its implica-
tions in an agreement.73 The choice of law was Delaware. Although 
both companies were Delaware corporations, no Delaware lawyers 
were in the deal. There was no strategic choice of New York law for 
formalism, nor was the choice made because of a need to be licensed 
in the chosen jurisdiction. This demonstrates the comfort level of a 
New York and a California law firm with a Delaware choice of law 
provision. 
TCo. A Co. C/L TCo. State T Coop A Co. State T Colaw ACo.Law 
Tax 
BN Berk Del DE only DE NY CA 
So what explains the choice of law for Delaware? Since Berkshire 
Hathaway ("BH") already owned a chunk of Burlington Northern 
("BN") and would be subject to internal affairs scrutiny,74 the firms 
were more comfortable having Delaware law govern than having the 
agreement scrutinized under New York law either in a New York fo-
rum or another forum. Because lawyers do not like to bifurcate law 
and forum,75 New York law would result in a New York forum, but 
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. 
70. A recent paper suggests that this confidence in Delaware contract law may not be war-
ranted and that "the virtues of Delaware courts in corporate law contexts may make them less 
than ideal at doing the ordinary work of resolving contract law disputes." John C. Coates, Man-
aging Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 295, 335 (2012). 
71. See Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15 (regarding California courts purporting to 
govern Delaware corporations). 
72. See Coates, supra note 70, at 308-09. 
73. Berkshire Hathaware bought all shares of Burlington Northern Sante Fe Corporation in a 
$44 billion deal; Bershire's largest acquisition. Michael J. De la Merced, Berkshire Best on U.S. 
with a Railroad Purchase, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/ll/03/ 
berkshire-to-buy-rest-of-burlington-northern-for-44-billion/? _r=l; Associated Press, Berkshire 
Completes Acquisition of BNSF Railroad, CLEVELAND (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.cleveland 
.com/business/index.ssf/2010/02/berkshire_completes_acquisitio.html. 
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying material. 
75. See supra Part III.C. 
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the court would defer to Delaware law under the internal affairs doc-
trine. Lawyers might fear that New York courts will misapply the 
Delaware law on the very important corporate issues. Accordingly, 
the parties will typically prefer to have Delaware law govern, prefera-
bly in a Delaware forum, even if neither law firm is a Delaware firm. 
In addition, BN was an acquisition of a public company. After BH 
acquired the rest of the BN that it originally did not hold from the 
public, there was no reason to have the representations or indemnities 
survive the transaction. And, the agreement said that the representa-
tions and warranties would not survive the merger. The most impor-
tant provisions would be the MAC clause and the no-shop provision, 
and both lawyers would be very comfortable with Delaware law gov-
erning these corporate issues.76 Most law firms, including the New 
York and California firms in this deal, seem fairly comfortable with 
Delaware contract law, consistent with the survey. 
A future study could include a question on the structure of the 
merger to determine whether it was a true merger or a non-true 
merger. With this information, one could determine how that deal 
structure affected the answer to the comfort with New York and/or 
Delaware contract law. 
Another explanation for greater comfort with Delaware contract 
law over New York contract law is based on the relationship between 
forum and law. Lawyers may simply be more comfortable with how 
the Delaware Chancery Court will respond, and see the New York 
court as unpredictable. To avoid bifurcating, Delaware may be fa-
vored as the choice of law. A future study could also ask about what 
contract provisions matter in M&A agreements and ask the lawyers 
whether they differ significantly in Delaware and New York for buy-
ers and sellers. 
It may also, according to Professors Cain and Davidoff, be due to 
events that preceded my survey, such as the fallout from the 
ConEdison decision and the 2008 financial recession. 77 
Finally, although more lawyers expressed being comfortable with 
Delaware than New York contract law, other lawyers still expressed a 
comfort with the contract law of both jurisdictions. One reason for 
the mutual comfort may be underlying structural factors that ensure 
76. The choice of law decisions seems to be made at the micro level rather than at the macro 
level. 
77. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 7, at 94-95 (discussing Consol. Edison v. Ne. Utils., 426 
F.3d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 2005)). The refusal of the New York court in ConEdison to allow target 
shareholders to sue for the share premium made some lawyers wary of choosing New York law 
in merger agreements. 
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that there will be few contract issues that arise in merger agreements. 
These possible factors might determine when the choice of law, in-
cluding contract law, might be important. For a large number of true 
mergers, the new public company merges out of the former public 
company as a subsidiary. In these cases, few contract provisions sur-
vive the merger, so the only provisions that will matter would be those 
involving events that occur prior to the merger, such as the MAC 
clause and the no-shop provision. 
On the other hand, with non-true mergers, where the merger com-
pany is not public, there will be continuing obligations to the share-
holder/parent such as representations, warranties, and a possible 
continuation of services, all of which will implicate contract law.78 
In these situations the answer to whether one felt more comfortable 
with New York or Delaware contract law might depend on whether 
you need to be concerned with matters that go beyond corporate re-
lated issues, such as the MAC clause and the no-shop provision, and 
involve representations and warranties which survive the closing. For 
those lawyers involved primarily in true mergers, the number of con-
tract issues will be small and mostly concerned with the time prior to 
the closing.79 Because those issues are likely to be confined to the 
MAC clause and the no-shop provision, if the lawyer is confident on 
how those two issues will be resolved, the lawyer might express a high 
degree of confidence in both New York and Delaware contract law. 
As to the second question posed in this section pertaining to how 
the difference in comfort level between New York and Delaware law 
affect this article's theory, the theory is supported. The higher com-
fort level with Delaware law than New York law negates the strategic 
formalism theory. If lawyers were bent on adopting one governing 
law due to its superior formalistic quality, then it is unlikely that the 
lawyer would express relative comfort with the contract law of both 
Delaware and New York. However, the fact that lawyers tend to be 
comparably comfortable with both laws also negates the reflexive cop-
ying theory. If lawyers are copying provisions without any thought, it 
is unlikely that they will be able to compare the law of New York and 
78. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. See GLOVER ET AL., supra note 67, at 
§ 10.02(2](b]. 
79. Professor Nadelle Grossman pointed out that "around 90% of them are challenged in 
court. The usual challenge is by a dissident shareholder-someone who usually acquires shares 
after the deal has been announced and through a fiduciary duty suit against the target board, 
seeks additional disclosure and/or seeks to have the acquirer up its offer." Email from Professor 
Nadelle Grossman, Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, (Mar. 7, 2014, 11:05 EST) 
(on file with author). 
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Delaware and to give an answer to their comfort level with both juris-
dictions. In certain instances, lawyers may push for a particular state's 
law (New York or Delaware) depending on how the state law re-
solves: (1) the survival of the statute of limitations and (2) sandbag-
ging80 and whether the lawyer is representing a buyer or seller. The 
speed of resolution could also influence a choice for Delaware law, 
particularly in a period of financial instability.81 Accordingly, this Ar-
ticle's theory of moderate thought is supported by these results. Some 
thought is put into this decision, largely dictated by the context of the 
agreement and its unique circumstances. 
B. Do Lawyers Report the They Care about Formalism? 
The survey seeks to resolve one of the most persistent debates in 
the contract literature: whether there are perceived differences be-
tween how strictly New York and Delaware interpret contracts. 
Question 4 in the survey asked the respondents to "[p ]lease compare 
the substantive contract law of New York and Delaware and pick 
what you feel is the appropriate answer to describe the relationship in 
terms of a strict approach to contract interpretation." The study 
posed this question because the recent economic literature portrays 
the flight to New York as a preference for the stricter formalism of 
New York's contract law.82 
The survey results do not demonstrate an overwhelming perception 
that New York law is stricter or more formal than Delaware law-
unlike the overwhelming disparity of the results showing the lawyer, 
not the client, makes the choice of law. Fifty. percent of respondents 
answered that they thought New York and Delaware shared an 
equally strict approach to contract interpretation. Approximately 
14.13% answered that Delaware had a more strict approach, while 
35.87% answered that New York was stricter. Clearly, a greater num-
ber of respondents view New York as more strict but half regard New 
80. Sometimes a buyer acquires information that might allow it to sue the seller for a breach 
of representation. However, if the information is acquired before the parties close, a question 
arises as to whether the buyer can sue for damages for breach of a representation in view of the 
pre-closing knowledge, because pre-closing knowledge could indicate that the buyer did not rely 
on the representation. In Delaware, a buyer can sue despite such knowledge unless there is an 
anti-sandbagging clause in the contract. New York only allows recovery if the source. of the 
knowledge emanates from a third party, not the seller. See, e.g. , Brendan J. McCarthy, Sandbag-
ging in M&A Deals: Is Silence Golden for Buyers?, STOUT Risrns Ross (2012), available at http:// 
www.srr.com/article/sandbagging-ma-deals-silence-golden-buyers. 
81. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 7, at 111. 
82 .. See Robert E . Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1641, 1654 n.55 (2003) (study of indefinite agreements found New York to be more 
formal). 
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York and Delaware as equally strict. The balanced answer to the 
question helps to explain why lawyers may not be strategically choos-
ing New York law as a means of ensuring formalism-lawyers may not 
think New York is more formalistic. 
The interesting data surrounding this question is actually the num-
ber of respondents who did not answer the question. With ten respon-
dents not answering, this question led to fewer answers generated 
than almost any other question.. Several possible explanations may 
underlie the high non-response rate. The question may not resonate 
with practitioners or it may be a grey area for which the lawyers do 
not know the answer. The lack of responses may also indicate that 
what lawyers are most concerned about is predictability based on a 
developed body of case law that addresses particular issues that are 
likely to arise, not formalism or strict interpretation.83 The lack of 
responses may show that lawyers are not even thinking in these terms 
of strict contract interpretation that are often employed by academics. 
Therefore, despite its resonation in the academic community, the im-
portance of formalistic contract interpretation may not mean that 
much to practitioners who may not have the training in the nuances of 
the contract law of their jurisdictions. 
While Question 4 sheds light on lawyers' desire for formalism, by 
asking about their perceived differences in strictness between New 
York and Delaware, Questions 10 and 12 explicitly ask lawyers what 
their reasons are choosing for New York and Delaware law, respec-
tively. These responses support the Article's hypothesis that lawyers 
put a moderate level of thought into choice of law provisions in 
merger agreements. Lawyers care about the jurisdiction having a "ra-
tional jurisprudence."84 That would seem to suggest that lawyers 
would accept a state's governing law if it were rational and not aber-
rant or irrational. Lawyers also report the volume of case law being a 
significant factor. This suggests an unwillingness to face the lack of 
precedent. Although these preferences negate unthinking copying, 
the preferences do not clearly indicate a strategic preference for for-
malism either. Even the one-third who ranked the substantive law of 
contract interpretation in New York as the top factor does not neces-
sarily mean that they were choosing formalism. Without an under-
standing of why a jurisdiction is chosen,85 the identification of a 
83. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. The issue of strict interpretation or formalistic 
interpretation "just did not come up." Id . There may be connections between predictability and 
formalism that could be fleshed out in a future survey. 
84. See infra Appendix Question 12. 
85. Deciphering who is behind the choice of law is complex. See supra Part III.A. 
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preference, for even a flight to New York, could not by itself demon-
strate a preference for formal contract law,86 even if one knew exactly 
what it meant to characterize the entire law of a jurisdiction as evi-
dencing formalism.87 Many reasons might underlie the choice for 
New York law and if those reasons do not demonstrate a preference 
for formalism as the motive for the choice of law, the hard data on the 
flight to New York would not support the new formalist claim.88 
C. Lawyers Report No Trend to New York A way from Delaware 
Questions 5 through 8 asked participants to opine on whether they 
felt there was a shift in choice of law in merger agreements from New 
York to Delaware or from Delaware to New York, and if so, how 
significant that shift has been. The survey does not support a shift 
from Delaware to New York; actually, it may demonstrate the oppo-
site. This is consistent with my 2013 statistical study and with the 2012 
study of Cain and Davidoff finding a flow toward Delaware after the 
financial recession.89 
Of reporting respondents, 65.05% indicated they had not noticed a 
shift from New York to Delaware for choice of law provisions in 
merger agreements.90 Of the 34.95% of respondents that felt there 
was a shift from New York to Delaware, 41.67% felt that this shift was 
significant and 13.89% felt it was very significant.91 Although more 
practitioners may feel there is not a shift away from New York to Del-
aware for choice of law provisions in merger agreements, those practi-
86. Even if there was a flight to New York, if New York and Delaware are equally formalistic, 
then some other factor would be motivating the move to New York as the choice of law for the 
merger agreement. 
87. Even if one could settle on or accept New York as being formal in some respects, such as 
adopting a hard version of the parol evidence rule, it could be contextualist in other ways. It is 
unlikely that a jurisdiction is ever entirely formalist or the opposite. See, e.g. , Wood v. Lucy, 
Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). Finally, even if the law of New York might be 
formalist on all fronts, the law of New York could have been chosen for reasons having nothing 
to do with its "formal" character. Moreover, the rejection of California law may be attributable 
not to anti-formalism but to a desire to avoid unpredictable results by California courts. 
88. Assessing the driving force behind a choice is one difficulty with empirical data. Even if 
the choice is made with volition and not randomly, what could one tell about the driver of the 
choice even if one could show a change in the disparity in the choice of law in a time series? It 
might show us that parties were influenced by a herd instinct to adopt the prior provision or 
perhaps that parties have been influenced by a buck-the-trend motivation, resulting in a change 
in the choice of Jaw frequency. We need more direct data on the motivation behind the choice of 
law to move from the data to the underlying driver of the object of cho;ce. 
89. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 7, at 95 . 
90. See infra Appendix Question 5. 
91. See infra Appendix Question 6. 
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tioners who do believe there has been a shift feel it is a relatively 
significant one. 
Conversely, 92.23% of respondents said that they did not feel there 
was a shift in choice of law from Delaware to New York.92 Only eight 
respondents felt that there was a shift from Delaware to New York, 
but of those eight respondents, six felt that the shift was only slightly 
significant. E ven the few who do feel that there is a shift felt it was 
only marginally significant.93 This strong response that there is not a 
shift in choice of law from Delaware to New York may be further 
evidence of the predictability that practitioners desire in making 
choice of law determinations. Delaware courts and judges are viewed 
as more experienced, and the high volume of case law allows lawyer to 
better determine possible outcomes if problems should arise that 
could lead to litigation. 
Because this new statistical study replicates the database of the ear-
lier study of Eisenberg and Miller and covers acquisitions of private 
targets, this study directly nullifies the earlier finding of a trend away 
from Delaware and toward New York. Still unresolved, however, are 
the reasons behind the choices that are being made, aside from any 
demonstration of a trend. 
D. Many Justifications for Choosing New York or Delaware Law: 
A Complex Picture 
I started out with the hypothesis that would tie the choice of law to 
attorney locale. I surmised that the shift to New York law, if any, 
could be explained by a lawyer's desire to have New York law govern 
because of a branch office in New York. I hypothesized that the law-
yers' primary goal would be to choose the law of a jurisdiction with 
which they were most familiar and in which they were licensed, in 
order to avoid malpractice claims. However, the survey showed that 
whether the firm is licensed in the jurisdiction was not a significant 
factor in the choice of law. Twenty-six out of forty-two respondents 
ranked the firm having an office in New York in the bottom three 
rankings for choosing New York law.94 A possible explanation may 
92. See infra Appendix Question 7. 
93 . See infra Appendix Question 8. 
94. Although many lawyers said the location of the firm did not matter, in some instances, the 
location of the law firm in New York or the presence of a branch office in New York seems to be 
the only factor to explain the choice of New York law. Consider the PNC/National City merger. 
See PNC-National City, Merger Proposed, SEC (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/713676/000095012308016152/y72384b3e424b3.htm. There, National City 
was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Ohio. PNC was a Pennsylvania corporation head-
quartered in Pennsylvania. Neither had any real nexus to New York. The choice of New York 
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be that malpractice concerns are not high when there is such a low 
probability of litigation ensuing. 
A competing theory proposed by other empirical scholars is a sub-
stantive preference for New York law due to its formalism, including a 
hard parol evidence rule. 95 The survey does not directly support this 
theory. If respondents chose New York law, the substantive law of 
contract interpretation ranked as the top reason for doing so. How-
ever, only about one-third of respondents gave that answer as the spe-
cific reason for their choice. The top reason for using Delaware law 
was a sufficient volume of cases,96 which had similar non-dominating 
numbers. 
Another competing theory was the unthinking copying theory, stat-
ing that lawyers simply copy language from a prior deal and give no 
thought at all to the boilerplate provisions. However, the fact that 109 
lawyers who worked on mergers agreements from a six-month period 
in 2011 were willing to fill out a twenty-four-question survey address-
law, however, may be explained when considering that the acquiring company lawyer, Wachtel! 
Lipton, was a New York law firm. In addition, Jones Day and Sullivan & Cromwell had no 
Delaware or Pennsylvania office, and since Sullivan & Cromwell is headquartered in New York 
City and Jones Day has a New York branch office, choosing New York law seemed easy, espe-
cially since no opinion other than a tax opinion was required. 
95. Kraus & Scott, supra note 9, at 1061-62. 
96. See infra Appendix Question 12. 
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ing the choice of law question indicates that the lawyers had given 
some thought to the matter, negating the unreflective copying of prior 
deal language theory. 97 
What I learned from looking at the actual data is that it is very hard 
to reduce the choice of law to one factor and that many different rea-
sons are given for a choice of law; there was not one overwhelming 
reason for choosing New York nor Delaware. The top reason given 
for choosing New York law was the substantive contract law.98 How-
ever, still only twenty-one of sixty-four respondents said this is the 
most important factor (32.8% ). One interviewed lawyer indicated 
that if the choice of law would be New York but for an objectionable 
substantive rule, the merger agreement would be drafted to contract 
around the objectionable rule rather than switching to another gov-
erning law.99 Another lawyer interviewed said "[n]othing in particu-
lar" about the substantive law of a particular jurisdiction influenced 
the choice of law. Rather, the "client is comfortable with New York 
law" from prior transactions and counter parties are usually okay with 
New York law and perceive New York law to be fair, reasonable, and 
customary .100 
Another significant reason for choosing a jurisdiction is the volume 
of case law. This was the top reason for choosing Delaware law, and 
most respondents ranked it in the top three reasons for choosing New 
York law. As one lawyer101 explained the importance of volume of 
case law, "you may have a target located in Nebraska and both parties 
willing to use Nebraska law other than the concern that there may not 
be enough actual business cases that have been decided under Ne-
braska case law. Random example, but I think certain states are con-
cerning because of the lack of case law."102 
One reason for the importance of volume of case law is that it low-
ers interpretation risk.103 As one lawyer said, "[t]he issues have all 
97. See GULATI & Scorr, supra note 16, at 33-44. 
98. One cautionary note is that the survey did not list "rational jurisprudence" as a possible 
choice for the question asking the reasons underlying the choice of New York law. Had the 
survey done so, the lawyers might have chosen rational jurisprudence rather than substantive 
contract interpretation. The differences between these terms and formalism could possibly be 
delineated in a further survey or in future lawyer interviews. 
99. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. " If otherwise choosing NY law and NY comes 
out a particular way through on~ of its default rules, then draft around the NY default rule; it 
would not be enough to shift the choice of law to Delaware." Id. 
100. Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 19. 
101. Interview with Lawyer 10 (Mar. 25, 2013) (on file with author). 
102. Id. 
103. Email from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
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been litigated."104 Further, another lawyer explained the value of con-
sistency: "if parallel provisions are in several agreements, and want 
consistent treatment, one might want to choose New York law where 
there is a large volume of cases that have treated and analyzed such a 
provision."105 Since lawyers make the decision on choice of law, not 
clients, this predictability is even more important.106 The failure to 
predict a case outcome would possibly leave the lawyer liable for mal-
practice, or at least subject the lawyer to criticism from the client for 
not being prepared for a particular outcome. 
Following volume of case law, the next top two factors for choosing 
Delaware are expertise of judges and a rational jurisprudence. The 
confidence in Delaware judges may cause lawyers to choose the law of 
Delaware because they are confident that the judges will apply the law 
more effectively. If they pick the law of New York, judges may be less 
expert and less reliable, and thus, there may be a less reliable applica-
tion of the governing rule. H owever, one lawyer indicated that New 
York does a better job adhering to plain meaning than Delaware.107 
In relation to rational jurisprudence, one lawyer said, "Delaware is 
chosen due to well known and well respected jurisprudence in the 
area of contract and M&A law."108 Both of these reasons, like vol-
ume of case law, also correlate with the desire for predictability and a 
familiar law that helps lawyers to avoid giving wrong legal advice. 
One lawyer who compared Delaware M&A law to Uniform Commer-
cial Code ("UCC") law, which has the perceived characteristic of be-
ing uniform, confirmed the predictability of Delaware.109 
The data in Question 12 raises some unanswered questions. It is 
not clear why substantive contract interpretation ranked more impor-
tantly for New York than Delaware. It could be that if one trusts the 
expertise of judges less, as lawyers seem to do for New York, then the 
substantive law of contract interpretation is more important as a pos-
sible constraint on court decisions. But as the degree of comfort in 
the expertise of the judges increases, as it does in Delaware, the con-
School of Law (Mar. 27, 2013, 21:58 EST) (on file with author). Lowering interpretation risk 
creates value. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Interpretative Risk and Contract Interpretation: A Sug-
gested Approach for Maximizing Value , 2 ELON L. REv. 109 (2011). 
104. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. 
105. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54. 
106. Predictability is more important than substantive law. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra 
note 47. 
107. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. 
108. Interview with Lawyer 4, supra note 37. 
109. Interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. 
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cern with the substantive contract law decreases because lawyers are 
confident that the judges will reach rational outcomes. 
Delaware may also be chosen as a fair compromise when there are 
no law firms in Delaware.110 An example involves United Airlines 
acquisition of Continental Airlines.111 
T.Co. A Co. C/L TCoSt TCoOp ACoSt TCoLaw ACoLaw 
Continental UA DE DE ? DE TX NY 
In the Continental acquisition, there were two Delaware corpora-
tions, two global law firms in Texas (Vinson Elkins and Jones Day), 
each with no Delaware office, and a New York law firm (Cravath) 
acting for the acquirer. New York could have been the logical choice 
since the New York law firm would have a preference for New York 
and the Jones Day and Vinson Elkins law firms each had a New York 
office. However, large law firms are comfortable with compromising 
on Delaware as the choice of law when none of them is in Delaware, 
as was the outcome here. 
110. Lawyer 8 mentioned Delaware as "compromise." Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 
21. 
111. See Dealbook, United and Continental Announce Merger, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/united-and-continental-announce-merger/. 
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Other factors affecting the choice of law for Delaware that were 
discovered in interviews include the view that, "Delaware is a good 
default rule" for private sellers not involving public companies.112 
Another lawyer indicated that the established strong fiduciary duty 
rules in Delaware influenced the choice of law for Delaware when a 
distressed sale was involved.113 Another said, "clients prefer Dela-
ware."114 Although lawyers typically decide choice of law, not the 
company, clients may have an influence in a subset of cases. 
Many other reasons that influence choice of law were mentioned in 
interviews. They include: whether the sale was one involving a dis-
tressed sale;115 whether the lawyer was representing a buyer or 
seller;116 whether the lawyer was representing a private company or a 
public company;117 whether the merger was a true merger involving 
the acquisition of a public company by a public company in which the 
public company was merged out of existence or a disposition in which 
a parent survives;118 the desire for a neutral forum with a sufficient 
body of case law;119 expertise of the judiciary;120 the location of the 
company's executive offices;121 a reluctance to split or bifurcate the 
forum and the choice of law; whether the law of a particular jurisdic-
tion would apply to part of the transaction due to the internal affairs 
doctrine;122 whether there was a developed set of rules on remedies;123 
the incorporation of the target or acquirer; and the sandbagging and 
survival of the statute of limitations in New York and Delaware. One 
lawyer cited the better quality of lawyers in New York for the choice 
of New York law because of a potential need to hire lawyers in the 
jurisdiction of the governing law if litigations ensues.124 One lawyer 
explained a New York choice of law in terms of a "desire for a neutral 
forum with a developed body of commercial law."125 The preferable 
112. Interview with Lawyer 4, supra note 37. 
113. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20. 
114. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54. 
115. See GLOVER ET AL. , supra note 67, at § 2.18(1), for a discussion of the particular issues 
arising when there are distressed companies. 
116. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20 (explaining the greater importance of established 
fiduciary law in Delaware when shareholders not getting 100%). 
117. Id. (explaining private companies want the forum and choice of law to be where they are 
located and public companies want the choice to be New York or Delaware). 
118. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. 
119. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54. 
120. Id. 
121. Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 101. 
122. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. 
123. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54. 
124. Interview with Lawyer 7, supra note 47. 
125. Interview with Lawyer 9, supra note 54. 
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travel and logistics of New York over Delaware were also cited as 
reasons for a New York choice of law provision.126 Finally, if the tar-
get is publicly held, then the target's state of incorporation is almost 
always chosen.127 In private company acquisitions, the buyer will usu-
ally have post-closing rights against target shareholders, so what law 
governs and which courts will hear it has greater meaning.128 Context 
places a critical influence on choice of law, at least as it is reflected in 
the lawyers' answers. A follow-up survey could incorporate some of 
these reasons that were mentioned in interviews. 
Another additional insight, though difficult to quantify, is that some 
lawyers may not consider the choice of law important129 or spend 
much time on it. Instead, the choice of law provision is considered an 
ad hoc decision that is not heavily negotiated ex ante.130 Lawyer in-
terviews suggested that either the choice of law is unimportant or is 
not so important as to be a "deal-breaker" and therefore not one that 
clients or lawyers would insist on. One lawyer thought that the entire 
survey was strange as so little time is devoted to the issue of choice of 
law.131 These findings suggest that there may be a disjunction be-
tween academics and practitioners on the significance of the choice of 
law issue. If this is the case, the reasoning behind the differences in 
how many agreements used Delaware law versus New York law may 
not be of great substance. 
Or, perhaps the choice between Delaware and New York is not very 
consequential because there are not that many substantive differences 
126. Id. (indicating the counsel is more limited and travel logistics are less desirable in Dela-
ware). See also interview with Lawyer 6, supra note 62. 
127. Interview with Lawyer 10, supra note 101. Contract law has little bearing on litigation in 
public company target circumstances. The target is the one that has real legal problems at the 
shareholder level, which is governed by its corporate law. The shareholders of the target will be 
cashed out or converted into buyer stock, and there is never any indemnity or covenant issue 
post merger, meaning a buyer's choice of law would be meaningless post merger. And since the 
premerger litigation generally comes from and is governed by the target's corporate law, why 
choose anything else? 
128. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. With private companies, New York or Delaware 
law will govern unless the entities are in the same jurisdiction. Interview with Lawyer 10, supra 
note 101. 
129. Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. But see Eisenberg & Miller supra note 4, at 1979 
(suggesting boiler plate quality of clauses "should not be taken as indicating that the clauses are 
unimportant."). 
130. Interviews with Lawyer 13, supra note 42; Interview with Lawyer 14 (Dec. 4, 2012); Inter-
view with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. But see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 1981 (suggesting 
that "choice of law and choice of forum provisions appear to be negotiated vigorously in these 
merger contracts.") 
131. See Interview with Lawyer 14, supra note 129. 
244 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:211 
between these states when it comes to business combination law.132 
Then, when fighting over New York versus Delaware law, there are 
only two major differences between the two: the survival of the statute 
of limitations and sandbagging.133 
A final thought to consider in comparing Delaware and New York 
for choice of law is that seventy of 100 respondents selected a choice 
of law provision other than Delaware or New York in a previous deal. 
After New York and Delaware, the two most popular states used by 
the respondents in merger agreements are California and Texas. This 
reliance on California is interesting as California courts are often 
viewed as unpredictable, and the survey otherwise indicates that prac-
titioners strive for predictability in choice of law provisions. Choice of 
law provisions outside of Delaware and New York may be the result 
of the company's location or the nature of that company. As one law-
yer explained, "[f]or private companies ... they want forum and law 
choice to be where they are located. "134 In contrast "for public com-
panies, Delaware or New York is always used."135 
In conclusion, there are a multitude of reasons that lawyers choose 
New York or Delaware law. There is no single overwhelming reason 
to choose either. Based on all the possible reasons for a choice of law, 
the unthinking copying theory is obviously not valid. The formalism 
theory is also negated by how many alternative reasons lawyers have 
for choosing New York law. The data suggests that there is a moder-
ate level of thought put into the choice of law decision, and that the 
decision is very contextual, as it can be driven by a large number of 
reasons depending on the circumstances of the parties, the lawyers, 
and the agreement. 
v. CORPORATE OPINIONS AND INFLUENCE OF INCREASED 
LAWYER LIABILITY 
The responses to Question 19, which asked whether a corporate 
opinion was required in the transaction, demonstrate that 76% of re-
spondents did not require corporate opinions on their transactions. 
Yet, in Question 20, 89.04 % of respondents reported that the fact that 
a corporate decision was not required did not diminish the importance 
132. Interview with Lawyer 8, supra note 21 (providing there are " [n]ot that many substantive 
differences on business combination law among the states."). 
133. These two major issues are used to decide choice of law depending on whether represent-
ing buyer or seller and how these issues affect the lawyer's client. Interview with Lawyer 1, 
supra note 20. 
134. Interview with Lawyer 1, supra note 20. 
135. Id. 
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of the choice of law provision. While 84 % of respondents to Question 
22 answered that they would be willing to accept a choice of law provi-
sion for a jurisdiction in which neither the lawyer nor a member of 
their firm were licensed, the results of Question 23 suggests that 67% 
would engage local counsel. In Question 21, one lawyer commented 
that his firm would only give corporate authority opinions in Dela-
ware, while another said that their firm would not comment directly 
on Delaware contract law, only the DGCL. 
The fact that 67% of lawyers would engage local counsel if not li-
censed in a jurisdiction in which they had to render an opinion, cou-
pled with the limits of the scope of an opinion that they would be 
willing to give, suggest a disjunction between what lawyers would be 
willing to accept in terms of choice of law and what may occur in ac-
tual practice. This concern about giving a corporate opinion in a juris-
diction where a lawyer or a member of their firm is not licensed may 
also relate to concerns about engaging in the unauthorized practice of 
law.136 A lawyer may have concerns about giving a corporate opinion 
for a jurisdiction in which they are not authorized because it creates 
an increased liability for the unauthorized practice of law and mal-
practice should their opinion be incorrect. 
Where a parent company has continuing obligations (as would be 
true in a private merger pictured infra), the acquirer may demand an 
opinion because they are the survivor company. The acquirer wants 
to be assured that continuing representations and warranties are en-
forceable against the parent as a matter of contract law and corporate 
law. Thus, they can run both ways, because the acquirer may be mak-
ing promises for post-closing payments if they have withheld or es-
crowed some of the purchase price for protection against breaches of 
warranties and covenants, or paying for noncompetes by the selling 
shareholders over the life of the noncompete provisions (which are 
tax gimmicks). Also, there may be post-closing covenants by the ac-
quirer, as in supply agreements to sell the seller products. 
For some lawyers the need to give such an opinion may not raise 
professional issues, but for others the need for a corporate opinion 
may change the comfort level with a particular choice of law provi-
sion. A firm may need to be qualified to render a corporate opinion. 
136. The concern with the unauthorized practice of law has generated scholarship. See, e.g., 
Stephen Gillers, Lessons from Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making 
Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685 (2002). 
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you nor your firm was licensed if you were not allowed to retain local 
counsel?" That question would help shed light on whether the need 
to render an opinion in the absence of local counsel affects the choice 
of law and in what ways. 
Further research should segregate the answers given by lawyers 
based on whether there was a true public-to-public merger or a pri-
vate merger,142 since the contractual issues differ significantly between 
them, as true public company mergers raise few contractual issues rel-
ative to private mergers. 
PUBLIC COMPANY MERGER 
Ta rget Company s.ha reholders. 
Target Company 
No enforceableo!Jligations su rvivethe merger 
PRIVATE COMPANY MERGER 
Target Company s.ha reholders 
Merger Ag1reement 
Contract 
Enforce.ab eobligations 
survivethe merger 
Tar get Company ltm••••••••••.i Ac:qu iringCompany 
No enforceableoblilgationssurviveth e merger 
142. The SEC EDGAR database that I used for my data set covers private mergers. EDGAR 
reports exist for some, but not most private mergers. EDGAR will cover a private merger when 
there is a controlling shareholder of the target public company, if the acquiring public company 
needs to have its own shareholders approve the merger and will cover a privately owned com-
pany that is raising capital in the public company to effectuate the merger, usually through issu-
ing debt, but sometimes equity. The key is that the target, the parent or the acquirer, must be a 
reporting company in EDGAR. A truly private company will not be filing with the SEC. Inter-
view with David P. Porter, Visiting Professor, Case Western Reserve School of Law (Nov. 6, 
2013) (on file with author). 
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One lawyer said that he was only comfortable giving a Delaware opin-
ion not a New York opinion.137 
The effect of the presence or absence of a corporate opinion can be 
seen in the following example involving Berkshire Hathaway's acqui-
sition of Lubrizol Corporation.138 
Target Acq.Co. 
Co Acq. Co. ChoiceLaw T.Co.State T.Co.op. State TCoLaw ACoL 
Lubrizol Berkshire Ohio OH No DE OH Ca. 
In the Lubrizol merger, the California law firm Munger Tolles & 
Olson did not care about the choice of law because they were not 
required to render an opinion. Because Lubrizol is Ohio centric,139 
choice of law would have been Ohio law under all normal circum-
stances. Although the internal affairs doctrine of Delaware would 
come up, the Ohio lawyers working on this deal (Jones Day, Ohio) 
would have been comfortable and familiar with Delaware corporate 
law. 
On this question of willingness to accept a choice of law provision 
for a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not licensed, one lawyer indi-
cated that although he was not knowledgeable about contract law in 
the jurisdiction chosen, they "do have New York lawyers that can ad-
vise if a particular issue arises during negotiations. "140 
Also, it should be noted that while Delaware is widely accepted as a 
choice of law for many firms without a branch in the state, the survey 
does not directly ask whether the lawyer would be willing to deliver a 
legal opinion on Delaware contract law without local counsel. The 
importance of local counsel when legal opinions are required can be 
seen in the answers to Question 23 in which 67% said they would 
engage local counsel if the choice of law were one which they were not 
licensed. One lawyer interviewed said, "[n]ot unless lender required a 
legal opinion. "141 
For a follow-up survey, I would ask the question again, excluding 
Delaware, and say, "would you accept a choice of law in which neither 
137. "My firm will not opine directly on Delaware contract law although it will opine on 
DGCL." Interview with Lawyer 5, supra note 15. 
138. News Release: Berkshire Hathaway to Acquire Lubrizol for $135 per Share in an All-Cash 
Transaction, SEC (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/ 
000095012311026351/142195exv99wl.htm. 
139. Id. 
140. Lawyer 2, who works for Cleveland firm with a New York office, said, "[y]es, if the client 
desired or if the other side insisted." Interview with Lawyer 2, supra note 19. 
141. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Empirical data can sometimes be used to support theoretical or nor-
mative arguments. This was true when the new formalists relied on an 
empirical study finding a flight to New York to argue that such a flight 
demonstrated the preference of commercial firms for formal contract 
law. Another theory is that lawyers unreflectively copy choice of law 
provisions from prior agreements. This survey of lawyers from 343 
merger agreements seeks to resolve whether either of these theories 
can be validated in a set of 2011 merger agreements. This Article and 
the survey cast doubt on the claims for several reasons. First, the data 
shows that lawyers, not clients, make the choice of law. The choice of 
law does not represent, and cannot be used to argue that it represents, 
an unequivocal commercial firm choice. Second, the reasons for the 
choice of law are so variegated that they cannot support the argument 
that formalism is driving the choice. Third, lawyers do devote some 
attention to the matter, negating the notion that lawyers would copy 
language from prior deals without any thought. Finally, the data 
shows how important the particular context is and that without an un-
derstanding of all the variables, it is hard to decipher the meaning of 
the choice of law. 
Further research needs to be done segregating the choice of law 
results in private and public mergers to see whether the results on 
choice of law differ. In the true public merger case, there will be so 
few contractual issues that the choice of the law governing the con-
tract would have reduced importance when compared to the private 
merger where contractual issues exist post closing. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
Ple ase se lect a ph rase descr ib ing t he Impact of the choice of fo rum on the cho ice of law: 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
30 
20 
lO 
0'--.... ~~~~ ...... ~--J .... ~~~~...:.~--' ..... 
Significant impact Moderate impact Slight Impact No impact 
Answer Ba r Respo nse % 
S1gmf 1can1 impact 
tvlod rate 1mpact 
SHght mipact 
No impact 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Valuo 
-
• 
Average 
Yalu a 
1 89 
Variance 
0.65 
Sta nd a rd 
Devla llo 1l 
0 .80 
Total 
Res po nses 
103 
34 3301% 
51 4 9 51 ~o 
13 12.62% 
4 .85~'o 
103 100.00'·' 
Total 
Respondents 
103 
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Please se lect a phrase to describe how comfort able you, or a member of your firm, are with Delaware cont ract 
law: 
i 
3 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Very comfortable 
Answer 
Very comfortable 
Comfortable 
Probably comfortable 
Very uncomfo rtable 
To tal 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Va lue 
Avera g e 
Value 
1.50 
Comfortable 
-
-
Varia nce 
0.54 
Probably com.fortable Very uncomfortable 
Bar Re s pons e 'lo 
St a ndard 
Deviatio n 
0 74 
Tot a l 
Res ponses 
105 
66 62.8 % 
26 24 .76% 
12 11 .43Q/o 
0.9r. % 
105 10000% 
Tot a l 
Respondent & 
105 
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Please select a phrase to describe how comfortable you , or a member of your firm, are with New York contract 
law: 
· 1 
100 
90 
so 
70 
60 
Very comfortable 
Answer 
Very co mfo rtable 
Comfortable 
Probably comfortabl 
Vory uncomfortable 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Mu 
Value 
Average 
Value 
1.66 
Comfortable 
-
I 
Variance 
0.69 
Probably comfortable Very uncomfortable 
Bar Response "/, 
-
St andard 
Deviat ion 
0.83 
Tota l 
Responses 
105 
57 54 .29°~ 
30 2857°', 
15 14 29n'o 
2 .86% 
105 10000% 
Total 
Respondents 
105 
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Please compare the substantive contract law of Delaware and New Yo rk and pick what you feel is the 
appropr iate answer to describe their relationship. 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
Answer 
OP.hvr•re 'Jnr1 New Ynrl< sh::tre an 
. Ill '* 'rt ' !Ir ·M I ~ontr 1ct 
NPw Y<'1r1<. !aw L.:; much morH <1 trir t in 
-+t t 1ri:; -l' ·· in ·,. Of!l...iware 
0"lloware ti;'-4& <l mw·h mo1 f strict 
.Jppr 1U1 IC I lltf• r~td l •On 
Min 
Value 
~ · 
Mu 
Vah1e 
Average 
Value 
1.64 
-
Variance 
052 
Bar 
Standard 
Deviation 
072 
Total 
Respon e 
92 
Response 
46 5 .00% 
33 35.87% 
13 1413% 
92 100 0% 
Tota l 
R spondonts 
92 
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Have you not ice d any shift in the choice of law provision In merger agreements from a New York to a Delaware 
choice of law? 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
Yes 
Bar 
-----·· 
Average 
Value 
1.65 
Variance 
023 
Standard 
Oevlstlon 
0.48 
No 
Response 
Tot al 
Resp nses 
103 
67 
Total 
Re•pondenta 
I 
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6 
Please describe how significant t he shift has been. 
20 
18 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
Very significant Significant 
Answer 
I ! Very significant 
i Significant 
; 
: 3 i Slightly slgnificanl 
1 
lnsignif 1cant 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Mu 
Value 
-
I 
Average 
Value 
2.33 
Va rt a nee 
0.57 
Slightly significant Insignificant 
Ba• 
Standard 
Deviation 
07 6 
Response 
Total 
Responses 
36 
% 
sl 13.89% 
15 ! 41 .67% 
15 i 4167% j 
I l 2.78% l 
' 6 100 00% 
Total 
Respond ante 
36 
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Have you noticed any shift In the choice of law provisions In merger agreements from a Delaware to a New York 
choice of law? 
12 
200 
180 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
# Anawer 
I 
I Yes 
i 
No 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
2 
Yes 
r :-
Average 
Value 
1.92 
Bar 
Variance 
0.07 
Standard 
Deviation 
027 
No 
Response 
Total 
Reapon&es 
103 
i 
e l 
95 
103 
% 
7.77% 
92.23% 
100.00% 
Total 
Respondents 
103 
I 
I 
ii 
'I' 
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6 
Please Indicate how significant the shift has been. 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
0 
Very significant 
Answer 
Ve<y s19n1f 1cant 
Shghtly s19nif1cant 
To tal 
Mm 
Value 
Max 
Value 
-
-
Ave rage 
Value 
300 
Variance 
029 
St and ard 
Deviatio n 
0 53 
Response 
To tal 
Res ponses 
[Vol. 13:211 
12 !JQW 
Total 
Respondent s 
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Has there been a merger agreeme nt where you have chosen New York law? 
100 
90 
ao 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
Yes 
Average 
Value 
1.37 
Ba• 
Variance 
023 
Standard 
Oevlatlon 
048 
No 
Response 
Total 
Responses 
104 
66 
38 
104 
% 
63.46% 
36.54% 
100.00% 
Total 
Respondents 
104 
257 
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10 
Please rank the following reasons for your choice of New York law In order from 1to6, with 1 being tne most 
Important and 6 being the least Important . 
25 l 
I 
20 1 
15 ~ 01 
10 I 02 •3 
.. 
5 ' 
•5 J •• 
The availabnity The existence of New York's Your firm having The negotiating The language Ir) 
of a sufficient a business law substantlve law an office In New strength of the a prior deal 
volume of case court governing York State parties 
law in the contract 
business law interpretation 
Question 
i 1 The availability of a sufficient volume of case law 1n the 
, business law area 9 
! 
' 14 ' 
The existence of a business law court 
New York's substantive law governing contract 
interpretation 
Your firm having an office in New York State 
The negotiating strength of lhe parties 
The language In a prior deal 
Tho avallabillty of a The existence 
Statistic sufficient volume of of a 
case law In the business buslneas law area low court 
Min Value 1 l 2 ' 
Max Value 6 
Mean 2.68 4.24 
Variance 1.74 I 1.94 
i Standard 1.32 1.39 
1 Deviat ion 
Total i 
' Responses 47 4 2 
! Total 47 42 
' Res pondents 
l 8 
21 1 
2 l G 
10 
.] 
; si 
New York's 
substantive law 
governing 
contract 
Interpreta t ion 
1 ' 
2 .19 
1.72 
1.31 
47 
4 7 
Response 
14 I Si 2 ! 47 ; 
3\ 11 i 11 I 9 i I 42 ! I 
I I 
9 
' 
6 , 47 
ai Sj 7 ! 11 42 l 
10 9 i 6 I 2 
4 ' 
' 
10 15 
Your firm The having an 
off ic e In negotiating 
New York strength of 
Stato the parties 
1 ! 1 ; 
5 ! 
4 .07 3.02 I 
2.46 231 I 
1.57 ' i .52 
42 43 I 
42 43 
Average 
Value 
2.68 
4 .24 
2.19 
4.07 
Tho 
language 
In a prior 
deal 
4 .32 : 
3.32 
1.82 ' 
41 
41 
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11 
Has t here bee n a merger agreement whe re you have chosen Delaware law? 
i 
2 
200 
180 
160 
140 
120 
Anawer 
' i Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Max 
Value 
I 
• 
Ave rage 
Value 
1.04 
a .. 
Va riance 
0 .04 
Stand ard 
Deviation 
0.19 
No 
Respo nso 
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Responses 
103 
99 
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•;. 
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3.88% 
100.00% 
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Respondent& 
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i 
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12 
Please rank the following reasons for your choice of Delaware law In order from 1 to 6 , wit h 1 being t he most 
important and 6 being t he least Important . 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
The e:idstence The The expertise Delaware's 
of a rational availability of of the substantive 
jurisprucleoce a sufficient Delaware Jaw ol 
volume ol judges contract 
case law in interpretation 
Iha business 
Question 
The exi tence of a ratio nal Jllrisprudence 
The availabili ty of a SlJfficient vo lume o f case !aw in 26 the busme s area 
The expert ise o f the Delaware judges 20 
Delawares substantive law o f ntract interpretation 
Yo ur fir having an off ice 10 Delaware 
The nego!1at1ng strength of the parl1es 10 
The cho ice of law provision 1n a prior deal 
The 
Tho availability of The 
existence of B sufficient expen ise Stat istic vo lume of of the 
a ra tional 
case law in Oelawarn 
Your firm 
having en 
ofticein 
Delaware 
18 
The Th&choice of 
negotiating law provision 
strenglh of Iha in a prior deal 
parties 
17 9 
18 24 
29 16 6 
13 37 
8 32 
29 14 
11 10 
Delaware's Your firm 
• 2 
., 
•4 
• 5 
• 7 
Response 
70 
76 
74 
73 
53 
64 
65 
The substantl\le having 
negot iating law of an office 
contract in strengt h of j urisprud enc e t ho business jud g es Interpret at ion Delaware the parties 
Min Va lue 
Max Value 6 5 
' Mean 2.8 22 22 4 . 348 6.21 4 45 
Vari;:mce 2.39 112 123 1 23 14 295 
tandard 1 55 1 06 1 11 111 118 1 72 Oev1at1on 
Total 70 76 74 73 53 64 Respcnses 
To ta l 70 76 74 73 53 64 Respondents 
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Va lue 
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of law 
provision 
In a prior 
deal 
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1 12 
65 
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Have you chosen a jurisdiction f or the choice of law provision ot her than De laware or New York? 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
5o 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Value 
M3K 
Value 
Yes 
Average 
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Variance 
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Dev atlon 
0.46 
No 
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103 
7087 % 
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261 
II 
1)! 
262 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JoURNAL [Vol. 13:211 
14 
What jurisdict ion other than New York or Delaward did you choose? 
I 
Agreements British Ca Calif ca I if 0 r n i a Carolina Choice 
Colorado Columbia Connecticut Contracting Delaware Domicile Draft English Fl Florida Frequently 
Ga Georgia Home Idaho Illinois Indiana Israel Jurisdiction Kentucky Law Located M&a Maryland 
Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Netherlands Nevada North Ny Occasionally Ohio Oil Ontario 
TX 
Oregon Organized Pa Parties Pennslyvania Pennsylvania Quebec Rarely South Target 
Texas Transactions Tx Wisconsin 
Text Entrv 
California/Nevada 
idaho 
! California 
Califo rnia 
' COLORADO 
I Domicile of Contract ing Part y 
I 
Texas 
Texas for oil and gas transactions where parties are located 1n Texas 
Ulinois 
View More 
Statistic 
Re pendents 
Value 
67 
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15 
Please rank the reasons for your choice of non-Delaware or non -New York law, with 1 being the most important 
reason, 6 be ing the least important . 
1 
4 
The existence of The availability The expertise of Delaware's The negotiating The choice of 
a rational of a sufficient the jurisdiction's substantive law strength of the law provision in 
jurisprudence volume of case judges of contract parties a prior deal 
law in the interpretation 
business area 
•1 
., 
• 3 
•4 
• S 
Questio n Response 
The existence of a ra tiona l Jurisprudence 5 40 
T he availability of a sufficient vo lume o f case law 1n the 8 15 40 business area 
T he expertise ol the JUrisdictio n's JUdges 12 13 4 35 
Delaware's subs tantive law of co ntract inlerprelation 3 10 10 32 
The negotiating st rength of the part ies 32 48 
The choice of law provision in a prio r deal 13 5 · 16 44 
Average 
Value 
330 
2 .95 
4 40 
4 38 
1.75 
398 
The The Oelaware' a The Tho avall~b lli t y of a 
expertise o f substa nt i ve The c hoice o f 
Statistic e.cist ence o f sufficient 'i'Olume of the law of ne gotiating law a rational case law In t he juri~ d 1 c tl o n's contract st reng t h of pro vision jurisprud ence b usiness area t he part ies in a p rio r judges Inte rpretation deal 
Min Value 1 ' 1 1 ' 
Max Value 6 6 6 
Mean 33 295 4.4 4 .38 175 3.98 
Variance 24 2 1.74 0 95 282 1 68 3.33 
Standard 1.56 1.32 0 98 168 1.3 1.82 Deviat ion 
Total 40 40 35 32 48 44 Rasponses 
Total 40 4 0 35 32 48 4 4 Respondents 
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16 
If the acquiring or target company I• incorporated in Delaware but t he law o f another j urisdiction was chosen, 
was t here a des ire to avoid Delaware law? 
100 
90 
80 
Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Valuo 
Max 
Va lue 
-
Avera ge 
Va lue 
1.92 
Bar 
Va riance 
0.08 
St andard 
Devia t io n 
028 
Response 
To tal 
Res ponses 
84 
77 
84 
833% 
91 7% 
100.00% 
Total 
Respondents 
84 
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17 
Percent client d riven: 
50 
40 
30 
10 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
# Answer Bar Resp onse % 
0% 
'-
19 1900% 
10% 
-
24 211 00%} 
20% 
-
21 21 00°/o 
4 30% 
-
11 11 00% 
40% • 400% 
' 6 50% 
-
9QQO{, 
60%. I 3 QQG/,, 
7()% 
• 5.00% 
80% 200% 
10 90% 0 000% 
' 11 1Q()D{, I 200% 
Total 100 100.00% 
Min Max Averag e Variance Standard Total Total Value Valu Va lue Deviation Responses Respondents 
11 349 563 237 100 100 
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18 
Percent firm driven: 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
0% 10°.4 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%. 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Answer Bar Response % 
' 1 0% 2.00% 
I I 
2 10% 0.00% 
13 • 20% I 3.00% 
30~ ~ • 500% 
i ! 40% 5 • 5 5.00% 
16 i 50% 
-
10 10.00% 
' :1 0% • 7 00% 
18 i 70% l- 16 16.00% l 
I 
i 80% l g 
-
18 1800% 
! 10 9Q<:i/o 
-
17 17 00% 
:,, 100°/o 
-
17 17 00% 
Total 100 100 .00% 
Min Max Average Variance Standard Total Total Value Value Value Deviation Responses Responderit1 
11 812 588 2 43 100 100 
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19 
Was a corporat e opin ion required in your t ransact ion ? 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Va lue 
Max 
Va lue 
Yes 
-
Average 
Value 
1.76 
Bar 
Varfa nce 
0.18 
Sta ndard 
Dev at Io n 
0.43 
No 
Response 
Tota l 
Responses 
100 
24 
76 
100 
2400% 
7600% 
100 0~'0 
Total 
Res ponde nts 
100 
267 
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20 
Did the fact that a corporate decision was not required lessen the importance of the choice of law provision ? 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
:lO 
20 
10 
0 
# Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Mm 
Va lue 
Mu 
Value 
Yes 
-
Average 
Value 
1 89 
Bar 
Variance 
0.10 
Stand ard 
Deviation 
0.31 
No 
Res po nse ' 
Tota l 
Responses 
73 
8 
65 
73 
% 
10.96% 
89.04 % 
100.0 % 
Tota l 
Res pondent s 
73 
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21 
How did the fact that a corporate opinion was required Influence the choice of law? 
Advice Authority Availability Case Chose Chosen Club Comfort Contract Corporate 
Counsel D e 1 aw a re Dgcl Directly Effect Enforceabil ity 
Established Event Familiar Firm Focus General Give Greater Helped Impact 
Jurisdiction LaW Lawyer Licensed Litigation Local Marginally Member Michigan 
Needed Opine Opinion Qualified Require Significant State Writen York 
Text Entry 
Firm needed to be qualified in juri sdiction, our firm o nly gives corporate authority opin ions in Delaware. 
We chose the law that does not require a lawyer who is a "member of the Delaware club" in the event of litigatio n 
Marginally greater comf o rt with Delaware t:::ase law 
My firm will not opine directly on Delaware contract law (enforceability), all hough we will opine on the DGCL. 
significant impact 
Not at all 
It did not 
Only comfortable giving Delaware opinion not New York 
Need to be licensed to give writt en opinion bu t not lo give genera l advice 
It did not 
View More 
Statistic Value 
Respondents 20 
269 
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22 
Would you have been willing to accept a choice of law provision f or a jurisdiction In which neither you, nor• 
member of your firm, was/ls llcenaod? 
I 1 
i ;2 
100 
90 
eo 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Answer 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Mu 
Value 
Yes 
-
Average 
Value 
116 
ea, 
Variance 
013 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.37 
No 
Response 
To tal 
Responses 
102 
86 1 
16 
i 
102 
% 
84 .31% 
1569% . 
10000% 
Total 
Respondents 
102 
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23 
Would you have specif ied local counsel If the agreement specified the law of a jurisdiction In which neither 
you, nor• member of your firm, practices law? 
100 
90 
80 
10 
# Answer Bar Respo nse % 
Yes 64 67 .37% 
I 
i 
No 31 32 .63% I 
Total 
Min 
Value 
Max 
V& lue 
Average 
Value 
1.33 
Variance 
0.22 
Standard 
Deviation 
047 
Tota l 
Responses 
95 
95 100.00% 
Total 
Respondent a 
95 
I 
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24 
Comme nts: 
Buyer Ca e Certainty Choice Choose Ch sen Close Con tituent Continues Corporahon Counsel Courts Cuts Day 
De I D e I aw a re Dictates Enhties Generally Hand Happened Judo 1ary Junsdichon 
L aw l ocal l ocated Makes N y Practloe Prefer Primary Prioritizing Rankings Re sons Require 
Selected Sh1ft1ng Target Tend Venue York 16 13 t516 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 3233 34 35 36 
37 38 39404 1424344 454647 4849 50 515253 54 5556 57 58 59 606162 63 64 65 66 67 869 70 71 
Text Ent ry 
Choice o f venue may be ot her than Del or NY even if Del or NY law is selected because one or bo th constituent 
enlil!os 1e I cated 1n a jurisd1ct1on other than NY and Del 
63 
11 
48 
20 
12 
None 
28 
View More 
S tat ist ic Value 
Respondents 77 
